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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

FILED
Utah Court of ADDNIS

APR - 1 1998
STEVEN D. CALDWELL,

Julia D'Alesandro
Clerk of the Court

APPELLANT,
vs.

Court of Appeals
Docket No. 970239 - CA

LAUREL W. CALDWELL AND
NELDA WALL,
APPELLEES,

RESPONSE OF APPELLEES TO PETITION FOR REHEARING

Appeal from the Third Judicial District Court
The Honorable Frank G. Noel, District Judge

DELANO S. FINDLAY
Attorney for Appellees
Laurel W. Caldwell and Nelda F. Wall
923 East 5350 South
Suite E
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117
STEPHEN G. HOMER
Attorney for Appellant
Steven D. Caldwell
9225 South Redwood Road
West Jordan, Utah 84088

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STEVEN D. CALDWELL,

:
:
:

APPELLANT,

RESPONSE TO PETITION FOR
REHEARING

vs.

:

LAUREL W. CALDWELL AND
NELDA WALL,

: Court of Appeals
: Docket No. 970239 - CA
:
:

APPELLEES,

Appellees respond as follows to the Order of this Court dated March 18, 1998 directing
them to respond to Issues II and III of the Petition for Rehearing:
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PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
The Court should deny appellant's Petition For Rehearing. The Complaint of
appellees for renew the judgments and/or orders contained in the Decree of Divorce
was not facially deficient. Further, where he has been so callous in his disregard of
that Court's orders and processes in the divorce action appellant should not be allowed
on the basis of his own self serving statements only to come back into the courts of this
State and mount a collateral attack to an order of the court.

n.
THE COURT'S DECISION DOES NOT IGNORE DEFENDANT'S
ANALYSIS OF RULE 54(c)(2) ISSUES
Appellant Steven D. Caldwell argues that this Court's decision on appeal
ignores his Arguments that the order of the Court below renewing the judgment did
not comply with Rule 54(c)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. He charges the
Court's statement that he did not cite authority for his arguments is erroneous and
asserts again that Stevens v. Collard, 837 P.2d 593, 194 UAR 60 (Utah App. 1992) is
authority for his argument. However, the Stevens case does not deal with what
appellant argues as a Rule 54(c)(2) issue. It is not about a judgment varying from that
strictly prayed for in the complaint as appellant is arguing here. Stevens v. Collard did
not even deal with the renewal of a judgment, but dealt with whether the allegations of
the complaint could support a judgment that there had been a substantial change of
circumstances which justified a change of custody of minor children previously
awarded in a divorce action. The Court in Stevens held that the complaint did not set
forth sufficient facts to support the change of custody by default ordered by the court
2

below.
In the case now before the Court the complaint clearly alleges that a decree of
divorce had been entered by the Court below and sought a renewal of the judgments or
orders in the decree. The facts that a judgment or order to pay money has been entered
and is outstanding and is about to expire are the alleging of sufficient facts to support
an order renewing the judgment. The Stevens case is inapposite to the issues argued by
appellant. Rather appellant's argument is that the renewal of the judgment with regard
to the order in the Decree that he pay a sum certain toward a second mortgage held by
Hal E. Wall is different than that prayed for in the demand for judgment. However,
the judgment or order renewed is the same order that he pay the same principal sum of
$10,069.00 together with accrued interest at the legal judgment rate; something he had
been successful in evading since the entry of the Decree of Divorce. The only and
slight variance is that the court below ordered him to pay the amount to Nelda Wall the
surviving spouse and heir of Hal E. Wall since appellant had evaded payment for
several years until after Hal E. Wall had deceased. The pleadings clearly alerted him
that a renewal of the judgment was being sought for the estate of Hal E. Wall. Is a
judgment in the name of Nelda Wall, surviving spouse and heir of Hal E. Wall really
any different.
The question is whether he is paying a different judgment? He is not. Or
whether he is ordered to pay more than the amount of the judgment? He is not. It is
the same. As noted in the Court's order, appellant cites no authority that opposing the
Court's decision on appeal. His only authority is his own construction of the
3

provisions of Rule 54(c). He argues that it varies in kind from that prayed in the
complaint. It does not. Does the judgment order him to pay a debt that he was not
lawfully ordered to pay in the Decree? It does not. Does the order renewing the
judgment or order of the Decree change the character of the order in the Decree? It
does not. He is still ordered to pay the sum of $10,069.00 toward the second mortgage
held in the name of Hal E. Wall, but is now ordered to pay it to Nelda Wall because
Hal is deceased.
Appellant argues that Nelda Wall was not a party to the divorce action. That is
true, but neither was Hal E. Wall. Yet the Decree ordered him to pay the amount
specified on the mortgage to Hal E. Wall just as many divorce decrees orders one of
more of the parties to pay indebtedness to creditors. It did not order him to pay it to
the plaintiff, Laurel Caldwell. Further Laurel Caldwell was a party to the renewal
action and contrary to the contentions of the appellant is a party to this appeal. She has
an interest in his paying the mortgage because she is jointly liable on the mortgage. If
Nelda Wall is improperly listed as a party it does not defeat the renewal of the
judgment because Laurel Caldwell, the plaintiff, was and is a party.
As a practical matter, should the heir to the estate of Hal E Wall have to go to
considerable additional expense, in addition to costs of collection, just to collect the
debt the defendant was ordered to pay and has been successful in avoiding for several
years even until after the death of Mr. Wall? Does the broad purpose and application
of Rule 54(c)(2) allow for such practicalities where the judgment debtor is not
prejudiced and is not required to pay anything but what he was required to pay from
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the original order? Appellees submit that it does.
How then is the appellant prejudiced? Where is his standing to complain? He
is only being required to pay what the Decree initially ordered him to pay and nothing
more. Further, he did not to come to Court when he was served. He was absent when
he should have been there to contest the proceedings. His self serving contention that
he did not get notice is of no avail and is unbelievable. He complains that Nelda Wall
is not a party to the divorce proceedings. However, the complaint for renewal of the
judgments in the Decree clearly has Nelda Wall as a Party. He could have appeared
and objected to it before an order was issued, but he did not. From his complete
indifference to the Court's orders in the divorce action after he moved out of the state,
the court below was well justified to infer that he chose to stay away. It was the same
pattern of conduct as his conduct in the divorce case.

in
THE COURT'S DECISION DOES NOT IGNORE THE ISSUES
RAISED BY THE STEVENS V. COLLARD DECISION
Appellant's third argument in his motion for rehearing is answered by the
previous arguments of appellees. Stevens v. Collard, goes to the issue of whether the
allegations of the complaint are adequate upon which to base the default judgment. In
this case appellant had adequate notice and the complaint clearly alleged that the
appellees were seeking to renew the judgment or or Order in the Decree that the
appellant pay the ordered amount toward the second mortgage. If Stevens v. Collard is
applicable at all, the order below does not offend its holding.
CONCLUSION
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The Court should reject and deny appellant's motion for rehearing or for
reconsideration. He did not come to Court and complain about the form of the
complaint or the relief sought in a timely manner. He ignored the processes of the
court below until he was caught with enforcement of its order. The Court should not
give any more deference now to his requests than he gave to the processes of the Court
at the time of the service of process.
In the alternative if the Court determines the issuance of the renewal in the
name of Nelda Wall is inappropriate, the Court should remand the case to the court
below to reform the judgment. Finally should the Court determine that the complaint
did not properly plead the renewal of the Decree, the case should be remanded to the
court below to consider the appellees' motion to amend the complaint. Now that the
Court finally has the attention of the appellant, it would not be a just or proper remedy
to simply vacate the order of the Court below with nothing more as appellant asks this
Court to do.

__

Respectfully submitted this/^day oi/^^^C^.

Delano S. Findlay
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